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     In the early 1950s, American anthropology, taking stock of community studies from Asia  
and Latin America, attempted to theorize a new subject matter, the peasantry.  Robert  
Redfield’s exploration of Mexican villages pointed to a defining characteristic: peasants, as  
distinct from “tribesmen,” are integrated into the “wider society” – the cities, markets, and  
state institutions -- of which their communities are “a part.”  Around the same time, a few  
anthropologists in Britain and France departed from fieldwork in colonial possessions to  
study the peasants of large “complex societies.”  With his ethnography of a village in  
Andalusia, published as The People of the Sierra in 1954, British anthropologist Julian Pitt-
Rivers made the opening foray into the Mediterranean area, long of interest to  
archaeologists, historians and literary scholars, but not to “social” anthropologists.  
     Pitt-Rivers was initially defensive about doing “real” anthropology in Spain, fieldwork  
having theretofore been defined, at least in Oxford, by hardship.  The die was cast, it seems,  
for anthropologists of the Mediterranean to steer clear of cities, documenting family and  
kinship relations, subsistence practices, informal relationships, and moral values in remote  
and small communities. The question for us is how this research articulated with, or  
challenged, the Cold War hegemony of the United States.  Two tropes of Mediterranean  
anthropology during the 1960s – “honor and shame” and “amoral familism” – point to  
somewhat inconsistent, and very provisional answers, as suggested below.
From Community Studies to Honor and Shame   
     In 1959, at the initiative of Pitt-Rivers, the Wenner-Gren Foundation sponsored a  
conference to compare community studies taking place around the Mediterranean.  The  
participating anthropologists included one American, five British, four French, two Greek, one  
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Spanish, one Italian and one Libyan; a handful of classicists and literary scholars also took  
part.  Mediterranean Countrymen, the volume of 1963 edited by Pitt-Rivers, covers the social  
structures of rural communities in Spain, Egypt, Algeria, Greece, Corsica, Morocco,  
Lebanon, Turkey, and France.  Pitt-Rivers laid out the following generalizations in his  
introduction:  The Romans had built their empire around this sea for the good reason that its  
restricted distances and “kindly” waters enabled conquest, colonization, trade and piracy.  
Continuous maritime contact over subsequent centuries meant “a high degree of  
technological homogeneity” and exposure of the entire littoral to not one but two great 
religions, Islam and Christianity.  Overarching ecological conditions, highlighted by Braudel in  
the 1940s, were also noted.  Later summarized by Louise Sweet (1969), these included “an  
urban character of peasant life (in agrotowns), the predominance of large estates for the  
production of grains, and transhumant pastoralism of sheep and goats” – all underpinned by  
“a similar climate, mountain topography, flora and fauna” in which vines, figs and olives,  
wheat, barley and beans, found a place” (Albera and Blok 2000: 18).  
     Nevertheless, Pitt-Rivers emphasized, although Mediterranean geography had a certain  
coherence, and was favorable to “unification by military force, settlement and, as soon as the  
commanding power relaxe(d), rebellion,” it was not supportive of “integration into a  
homogenous culture.”  Political and religious hierarchies replaced one another but left local  
communities more or less “faithful” to their traditions; nor had these communities been  
effectively absorbed, in modern times, under their national flags.  Rather, they “possess both  
more similarities between different countries and more diversities within their national  
frontiers than the tenets of modern nationalism would have us believe.”  The goal of  
Mediterranean Countrymen was, in effect, to subvert the stereotypes of national “cultures,”  
and “discover continuities which run counter to the varying political hegemonies, observing  
the exigencies of the ecology or the entrenched conservatism of the local settlement” (pp. 9-
10).  
     Contrary to what many have thought, the theme of “honor and shame” was addressed on  
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only one of the six days of the Wenner-Gren conference, and only appeared within a  
discussion of cultural practices surrounding friendship and hospitality.  Land tenure,  
inheritance, kinship, local economics and demography took precedence, along with the  
relationships of communities to cities and states as mediated by networks, brokers, and  
patron-client relations.  
     In the end, however, participants found the “greatest homogeneity” to be in “conceptions  
of the self and in values relating to the sexes” (Silverman 2000: 46-47).  One of the  
collaborators, Greek anthropologist J.G. Peristiany, garnered support for continued  
discussions in 1961 and 1963 from the Social Sciences Centre of Athens and the Greek  
Ministry to the Prime Minister’s Office – Press and Information Department, with an  
additional subsidy, in 1963, from Unesco.  One presumes the project had support from then  
Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis.  The result was the famed 1966 volume which  
Peristiany edited, Honour and Shame: the Values of Mediterranean Society .  The 
Mediterranean peoples discussed in this book (Spanish, Greek, Cypriot, Kabylian, and  
Egyptian Bedouin) were, Peristiany proposed, “constantly called upon to use the concepts of  
honour and shame in order to assess their own conduct and that of their fellows.”  
Additionally, the concepts were intensely salient for a reason: Mediterranean societies  
offered up “an insecure, individualist, world where nothing is accepted on credit, the  
individual is constantly forced to prove and assert himself … he is forever courting the public  
opinion of his ‘equals’ so that they may pronounce him worthy” (p. 11).  The insecurity and  
instability of status hierarchies meant that vindication of one’s honor was constantly required  
– not unlike medieval chivalry in Western Europe or street-corner gangs of the time.  
     A follow up “series of seminars,” supported by the Social Research Centre of Cyprus,  
resulted in Peristiany’s editing of another collection, Mediterranean Family Structures, in 
1976.  Covering an even wider range of “cases,” the twenty chapters of this book describe  
kinship and family dynamics among Maronites in Lebanon, Arabs in Israel, several  
communities in Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Spain, Italy and Greece, and one in Albania.  The  
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variety notwithstanding, the theme of honor constitutes a thread of continuity, resonating with  
the struggles of nuclear and bilaterial families to express their “moral heritage” and “social  
achievement.”  
     Peristiany characterizes these struggles as agonistic -- “a contest before a chorus, a  
commenting and evaluating audience” (1976: 23).  Contributions to the collection from  
Greece, in particular, give “the stark impression of a society in which every family is a self-
contained moral entity defending its honour against all comers, when not actively engaged in  
replenishing its anti-reputation armory for future use.”  As in the earlier volume, Peristiany  
concludes that “the putting to the test of a person’s worth is a sign of status insecurity in a  
society where all may claim to be equal, the lack of a clear gradation between ideals, and  
thus of a clear hierarchy of prescriptive rules, is a reflection of this type of egalitarian,  
unclearly structured and thus ‘anarchic’ social order” (1976: 23-25). 
     The index of Family Structures includes roughly 30 entries on “honour” scattered 
throughout the text, and a half dozen on chastity or virginity, also widely distributed.  In the  
Mediteranean, it seemed, the male-female relationship rendered male honor dependent  
upon, and vulnerable to, the behavior of close female relatives.  By this time “Mediterranean  
modes of thought” were believed to include the ideas that women be excluded from public  
space, that brides be tested for virginity on their wedding night, and that adulterous wives be  
murdered (Peristiany 1966: 9).  Whether intended or not, a sexualized understanding of  
“honor and shame” had risen to the top of a Mediterranean “trait list.” 
      By the 1980s, a new generation of anthropologists was challenging this model.  Troubled  
by a picture so “ahistoric and essentialized,” from which differences and flux were eliminated,  
critics questioned the very notion of the Mediterranean as a homogeneous “culture area”  
(see Herzfeld 1980; Blok and Dionigi 2000: 19).  Notwithstanding the initial role of a Greek  
anthropologist, Peristiany, in drawing attention to “honour and shame,” critics argue that “the  
complex,” now described as “alleged” or “so-called,” emanated from the ethnocentrism of  
Anglo- and American Orientalist traditions.  Arjun Appadurai’s observation is apt.  “A few  
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simple theoretical handles become metonyms and surrogates for the civilization or society as  
a whole: hierarchy in India, honor-and-shame in the circum-Mediterranean, filial piety in  
China … all … gate-keeping concepts … that seem to limit anthropological theorizing about  
the place in question … that define the quintessential and dominant questions of interest in  
the region” (quoted in ibid: 19)  
     Today, after more than three decades of self-reflexive criticism, most anthropologists  
would agree with Frank Stewart that “not all peoples living on the shores of the  
Mediterranean have been affected to the same degree by their proximity to it; and even if we  
take groups like the Catalans and the Lebanese, who have been deeply affected, this fact 
does not entail that they should resemble each other more than they resemble their inland  
neighbors to the north and the east, respectively” (Stewart 1994: 78).  At the least nothing  
remains of Mediterranean “modes of thought.”  In 1992, none other than Peristiany and Pitt-
Rivers co-edited a collection on “honor and grace,” not “shame.”  Although the introduction  
and several of the chapters evoke competition for rank among men and women’s threat to  
honor through illicit sexual activity, some of the examples derive from non-Mediterranean  
societies and, moreover, other themes are given equal weight.  If anything, the emphasis is  
on variation, the editors having absorbed some of the criticisms of their earlier attempts to  
identify a “Mediterranean concept of honor” (see Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers 1992).     
      In the end it could be notable that “honor and shame” became the Mediterranean’s “gate-
keeping concept” in conjunction with U.S. Cold War hegemony in the area.  Without knowing  
of the construct’s resonance with funding bodies, media outlets, and publishing houses in the  
1960s and 1970s, one can only speculate.  To me, both the “orientalizing” thrust of the  
“honor and shame” trope, and its tendency to assimilate the rural populations of Southern  
Europe to North Africa and the Middle East, were congenial to the power projects of the  
United States whose architects were obsessed with the vulnerability of southern European  
peasants to communist ideology.  Anthropologists of the time surely devoted more energy to  
theorizing problems surrounding women’s seclusion than to probing such Cold War issues as  
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the resonance for peasants of left political parties and ideologies, or the urgency of land  
reform.  (I take myself as a case in point; see Schneider 1971).  
The Second Strand: Amoral Familism
     In 1963, anthropologists from the University of Michigan, together with colleagues from  
Seville, Paris and London, met at a conference in Ann Arbor on “The Village and its Setting in  
the Mediterranean Area.”  The conveners of this meeting, Eric Wolf and William Schorger,  
who had conducted fieldwork in the South Tyrol and Morocco, respectively, subsequently  
obtained a grant from the Ford Foundation, paving the way for several Michigan students to  
conduct ethnographic fieldwork in Sicily, Spain, and Morocco and to attend -- along with  
students and scholars from the L.S.E., University of Kent, and University of Amsterdam --  
two Mediterranean Studies workshops in Aix-en-Provence and Canterbury, in 1966 and  
1967, respectively.  Among the topics discussed at the conference and workshops was  
political scientist Edward Banfield’s The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, published in 
1958.  Based on fieldwork conducted with the help of his Italian-speaking psychologist wife in  
her community of origin – the small rural town of Montegrano in the Province of Potenza –  
the book attributed Southern Italian poverty and “backwardness” to a cultural ethos of  
“amoral familism” according to which people “maximize the short-run advantage of the  
nuclear family and assume that all others will do likewise.”  Thus the peasants of Montegrano  
seemed unable to delay individual gratification for the sake of long-term collective goals -- a  
result of attitudes that had been culturally transmitted over many generations.
     Skepticism toward Banfield’s unabashedly Protestant thesis was nurtured by participation  
in the anti-Vietnam war movement, strongly present on the Michigan campus in the early  
1960s, and by Wolf’s contributions to the new field of peasant studies.  Influenced by  
Marxism and by his personal experience as an Austrian Jew escaping the Holocaust, Wolf  
resisted determinative culturalist explanations of human behavior.  Praising Anthony  
Wallace’s 1961 call to think of culture as “the organization of diversity” rather than “the  
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replication of uniformity,” he departed from the “Culture and Personality” orientation of his  
former teacher, Ruth Benedict, which presumed that whole societies -- the Kwakiutl, the  
Zuni, the Dobu -- and even whole nation states – Japan or Russia – could be characterized  
by discrete clusters of traits reproduced through time as a consequence of child socialization.  
Wolf also weighed in on the peasant concept in the 1950s, arguing against Redfield’s  
culturalist emphasis on peasants as carriers of primordial folkways, defined as value-
saturated, timeless, homogeneous.  A 1964 book entitled Anthropology explored the history 
of the lay understanding of culture as something interior, down home, and "ours" as opposed  
to “civilization” which was outside and cosmopolitan.  Here, and in later work, Wolf traced  
how this notion of culture came to the fore in Europe at a time when some nations were  
contending for dominance while others were struggling to achieve separate identities and  
political independence.  An ardent opponent of nationalism’s excesses, he feared the misuse  
of a culture concept more attuned to emotion than to reason.  Theories of culture such as  
Banfield’s that postulate a supposed inner unity, and continuity from primordial beginnings,  
are, he believed, close to racism and politically dangerous.
 
Myths of the Mediterranean, a Sicilian Case:
     I count Peter Schneider and myself as among the Banfield-bashers, having been  
sensitized to the “amoral familism” debate before beginning our fieldwork in Sicily in 1965.  
Since Italian Unification, outside observers had represented Sicily as a timeless island  
whose inhabitants, although buffeted by foreign tides, clung to their homegrown passions,  
homegrown habits of crime and corruption, and a homegrown pessimism about change.  
Many Sicilians rendered the same stereotype, giving it even greater weight.  The resulting  
“myth of Sicily” evoked a more or less racialized past, outside of history, that was argued to  
account for the existence of Sicily’s renown institution, the Mafia.  The myth also furthered  
the mistaken assumption that Sicilian movements for social and political change – peasants’  
struggles for land reform or, more recently, the urban movement against the Mafia and  
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political corruption -- depend for their coherence on ideologies of modernity imported from  
outside. 
     In effect the stereotype depicted Sicilians as unable to solve problems, organized crime  
among them, because, like the Montegranesi studied by the Banfields, they lacked the  
cultural capacity to organize themselves to promote the common good.  Tapping a very  
different vein, in the 1980s and 1990s, we followed the impressive collective action of the  
antimafia social movement which, it turns out, had to confront both a cultural milieu  
conditioned by organized crime, and the equally conditioned political institutions of the  
regional and national state.  Greatly advancing our analysis was the growing historiography  
clarifying the role the Cold War played in this political corruption – for example: Allied support  
for mafia-protected landowners at the end of World War II; American support for postwar  
governments that marginalized the Italian Communist Party, even if this meant that Christian  
Democrats and later Socialists used mafiosi to “make elections;” the 1970s strategy of  
virulently anti-communist plotters in “deviated” Masonic lodges to invite selected mafia  
bosses to join the Freemasons and participate in coups; and (probable) mafia access to  
weapons stockpiled in support of the NATO “Stay-Behind” project, known in Italy as Gladio  
(for bibliography see Schneider and Schneider, 2003)  
     Thanks to these developments, summarized by historian Francesco Renda as “that  
wicked deal,” the Italian state was unresponsive to the escalation of the Mafia’s power over  
Sicily’s modern urban growth, which took off chaotically in the 1960s generating a litany of  
real estate and construction scandals.  More shockingly, the state turned a blind eye as two  
great factions of mafia cosche competed for control of the global traffic in heroin in the  
1970s, both assisted, when it came to money-laundering, by “deviated” Masonic bankers.  
Like the honor and shame trope discussed above, “amoral familism” is a gate-keeping  
concept that obfuscates understanding such social forces and relations.  And yet, the “myth  
of Sicily” persists, as illustrated by Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work; Civic  
Traditions in Modern Italy, published in 1993, a decade after the first stirrings of antimafia.  
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     For Putnam, Sicilians resist change for cultural reasons that are rooted in a “very deep”  
history.  From the thirteenth century the Island’s governments, at once feudal, bureaucratic,  
and absolutist, did little but attempt to impose “hierarchy” over a potent “latent anarchy”  
(Putnam 1993: 123-30).  As a consequence, Sicilians have continued to “lack” civil  
consensus, public faith, a “spirit of association,” and to be prey to inept and arbitrary justice,  
factionalism and corruption.  Putnam was aware of, but seemed indifferent to, the fact that  
his assessment is reminiscent of Banfield’s text, by then subject to several trenchant  
criticisms, two of which he cites: (political scientist) Sydney Tarrow’s of 1967 and 
(anthropologist) Sydel Silverman’s of 1968. 
Banfield Back Home
     Banfield is remembered by scholars on the Left (for example his student, Francis Fox  
Piven) as a decent but extraordinarily cranky conservative whose early history as a New 
Dealer in the Farm Services Administration paved the way for his deeply disillusioned critique  
of government interventions against poverty.  Indeed, before he and his wife left for Southern  
Italy, they lived in agricultural communities in the American West where they encountered  
1930s assistance programs that seemed to produce more harm than good.  Upon his return  
to the U.S., where he took up teaching positions in political science at the University of  
Chicago and Harvard (with an interlude at Penn), he became an ever-more outspoken  
opponent of redistributive policy, railing retrospectively against the New Deal and, as it  
unfolded, the Great Society.  His book of 1968, The Unheavenly City, the Nature and Future  
of Our Urban Crisis, is a classic in the “culture of poverty” literature – a platform, too, for  
counseling Nixon on the futility of welfare programs as head of his presidential task force on  
model cities, and for wholeheartedly participating in neo-conservative networks, institutions,  
and think-tanks.  
     For what it is worth, in 1963, the American Enterprise Institute published a 65 page essay  
by Banfield analyzing foreign aid doctrines. The text (revised from an earlier, 1961 article in  
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Public Policy) is a lengthy diatribe against both the doctrine of “indirect influence,” according  
to which aid can be expected to democratize the outlook and institutions of the recipient  
society by raising per capita income, and the doctrine of “direct influence,” aimed at fostering  
pro-American good will among business or political or intellectual elites, and through them  
with their governments.  Neither doctrine held water, he argued, any more than did doctrines  
unrelated to national security such as those that rested on concepts of altruism or community  
in world affairs.  To Banfield, the promotion of the welfare of other nations was a new and  
novel idea in political thought, and a silly one, too, because “doing good,” despite the best  
intentions of the do-gooders, may well make things worse.  Preserving liberal democracy in  
the West is best accomplished, he argued, not by foreign aid, whatever its justification, but  
by military action.  This, or its credible threat, is the only realistic and efficacious way to hold  
back the advance of the Soviet Union, and communist domination (p. 28, pp. 31-34).  
     To dramatize the point, Banfield imagined that even if all of the underdeveloped countries  
were to fall into communist hands, robbing the U.S. of missile sites, military bases, and  
listening posts near the Soviet border, long range missile technology would save the day.  
“So long as our enemies cannot prevent us from exploding a large number of nuclear  
weapons on their territory, we shall be safe from any attack that might threaten our national  
existence – as safe, that is, as anything we could do would make us – and if we maintain  
large conventional forces in Western Europe we can probably prevent an attack there too”  
(p. 34).  Given that America’s existence as a nation was not dependent upon giving aid,  
“possibly we should rely entirely upon military assistance, rather than upon aid, to check  
Soviet imperialism” (p. 36).      
     Banfield’s pessimism rested on several of his prejudices: that in underdeveloped  
countries, any gain in the standard of living was likely to be immediately offset by population  
growth; that aspirations rise faster than incomes, creating frustration and instability when  
unmet; and that some societies are incapable of development because their culture is an  
obstacle.  Citing the Navajo as a prime example of the latter, he goes on to argue that  
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“underdeveloped countries which are not primitive may (also) lack certain cultural or other  
prerequisites of development,” among them “at least a small class of persons having talents  
and incentives that lead them to organize, innovate, and take risks,” and a cultural milieu that  
respects concerted action for the common good.  A footnote refers readers to The Moral  
Basis of a Backward Society (p. 9).  After all, the people of Montegrano had proved that the  
redistributive transfer of wealth to those who are culturally ill-suited for “development”  
promises no rewards.  Perversely enough, it is “impossible” to use large amounts of non-
military aid with effectiveness (p. 11).   
     In a final reflection on the sorry state of doctrines rationalizing foreign aid, Banfield cites  
the Marshall Plan as necessary for the reconstruction of war-torn Europe but an unfortunate  
model for assistance to the underdeveloped world.  I have no idea who read his essay or  
what influence it may have had.  One assumes it resonated with the hawkish conservatives  
he thanks in the acknowledgements footnote.  It is intriguing, though, to put ourselves back  
in the early 1960s: in Greece, Peristiany was raising funds for the encounters that would lead  
to the “honor and shame” volume; in Sicily the Christian Democrats were weaving the  
intreccio that would so empower the Mafia; and in the United States Edward Banfield,  
reassured by his Southern Italian sojourn that some people’s cultures are hopeless when it  
comes to “achieving self-sustaining economic growth or … governing themselves reasonably  
well,” was proposing that foreign aid may not “on balance be in the interest of the United  
States or, indeed, of civilization” (p. 53). 
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